Outages and root causes.

Two years of public outages, and what each company said caused them. Every entry links to the company's own write-up; nothing here is our speculation.

Status pages re-read 4 min ago

Incidents with a published root cause

By month, last two years · GitHub

Peak 0 · December 2024

  • Total: 0
  • December 2024: 0
  • January 2025: 0
  • February 2025: 0
  • March 2025: 0
  • April 2025: 0
  • May 2025: 0
  • June 2025: 0
  • July 2025: 0
  • August 2025: 0
  • September 2025: 0
  • October 2025: 0
  • November 2025: 0
  • December 2025: 0
  • January 2026: 0
  • February 2026: 0
  • March 2026: 0
  • April 2026: 0
  • May 2026: 0
  • June 2026: 0
  • July 2026: 0
  • August 2026: 0
  • September 2026: 0
  • October 2026: 0
  • November 2026: 0
Incidents listed
0
With a published RCA
Official write-ups
0
Linked from the incident
Major outages
0
As graded by each company
Services
0
With at least one entry

Notable outages, summarised

Read from each company's published analysis and summarised in our own words. Follow the link for the full account.

  • GitHub

    Jul 19, 2026

    Internal DNS failure causes request errors

    GitHub reported elevated request failures across github.com and its data-residency environments, affecting Actions, webhooks and Copilot, with regional error rates peaking near 10%; customer impact lasted about an hour and a half within an incident of a little over two hours.

    Root cause, as stated by GitHub

    A database connectivity problem in the internal DNS control plane produced incomplete data that automated DNS reconfiguration accepted as valid, so internal names stopped resolving as caches expired.

    Read the official analysis (opens in a new tab)Report an error (opens a correction request in a new tab)

  • GitHub

    Jul 8, 2026

    Data-residency Enterprise Cloud environments down

    Web, API, Git, Actions, Packages and Copilot returned server errors in GitHub Enterprise Cloud data-residency environments for about seven hours, peaking near total failure in the worst-hit environment.

    Root cause, as stated by GitHub

    An automated metadata process changed a runtime configuration value on running VMs, breaking service discovery and leaving traffic routers without backends.

    Read the official analysis (opens in a new tab)Report an error (opens a correction request in a new tab)

  • GitHub

    Feb 9, 2026

    github.com, Git over HTTPS, Actions and Copilot degraded twice

    In two separate periods on the same day, users hit errors loading pages, running Git over HTTPS, starting Actions workflows and using Copilot, for a combined total of roughly two hours and forty minutes of degraded service.

    Root cause, as stated by GitHub

    GitHub says a configuration change to a user-settings cache triggered a flood of cache rewrites; these first overwhelmed a shared background-work component and later caused replication delays, each time exhausting connections in the Git HTTPS proxy.

    Read the official analysis (opens in a new tab)Report an error (opens a correction request in a new tab)

  • GitHub

    Feb 2, 2026

    Hosted Actions runners and Codespaces unavailable

    GitHub-hosted Actions runners were unavailable in all regions and Codespaces could not be created or resumed for nearly four hours, with knock-on effects for Copilot agents, CodeQL, Dependabot and Pages; degraded service continued until full recovery, close to six hours in all.

    Root cause, as stated by GitHub

    A loss of telemetry led to security policies being wrongly applied to backend storage accounts at the compute provider, blocking the VM metadata needed to create and manage runner VMs.

    Read the official analysis (opens in a new tab)Report an error (opens a correction request in a new tab)

  • GitHub

    Jan 13, 2025

    All Git operations unavailable

    Git operations on GitHub were unavailable for 49 minutes.

    Root cause, as stated by GitHub

    GitHub attributes it to a configuration change tied to traffic routing and testing, which made an internal load balancer discard requests passing among the services Git operations depend on.

    Read the official analysis (opens in a new tab)Report an error (opens a correction request in a new tab)

  • GitHub

    Aug 14, 2024

    GitHub.com fully unavailable

    All GitHub.com services were inaccessible to all users for 36 minutes, with the incident closed after further monitoring.

    Root cause, as stated by GitHub

    An erroneous database configuration change stopped databases answering health checks, so the routing layer marked them unhealthy and reads failed.

    Read the official analysis (opens in a new tab)Report an error (opens a correction request in a new tab)

From the status pages

Showing incidents whose vendor named me-south-1. Incidents with no stated region are not included, though they may have affected it too.

Nothing matches these filters.

Public information only

Everything on this page was already published by the companies themselves or by public bodies. statuswall gathers it in one place, links every item to its original, and adds nothing from private or leaked sources.

Sources

  • Official status pages: incident titles, severity, times and the link to each published root-cause analysis, exactly as each company posted them
  • Company engineering blogs and incident reports: the basis for the notable-outage summaries, each linked from its card

How fresh it is

  • Incidents and RCA links: re-read from every status page about once an hour; last run 4 min ago
  • Notable-outage summaries: written by hand and last checked against their sources on Nov 10, 2026

Titles, severity and times are as published on each company's status page. "Published RCA" means the company posted a postmortem on that incident's official page; we link to it and do not reproduce it. Many companies publish root causes on a blog instead, or not at all, so the absence of a link is not evidence that no analysis exists. Severity grading differs between companies and is not comparable across them. This is not a complete record of every outage.

statuswall is independent and is not affiliated with, sponsored by or endorsed by any company named here. Company and product names are used only to identify whose public information is being referred to. The information is provided as is, for general reference, with no guarantee that it is complete, current or free of error; it is not security, legal or purchasing advice. Where this page and an official source differ, the official source is right.